The main purpose of this paper is to introduce stream ciphers with the nonbijective encryption function of multivariate nature constructed in terms of algebraic graph theory. More precisely, we describe the two main symmetric algorithms for creation of multivariate encryption transformations based on three families of bipartite graphs with partition sets isomorphic to K , where K is selected as the finite commutative ring. The plainspace of the algorithm is Ω = { | ∑ ∈ K * , ∈ K } ⊂ K , Ω ≅ K * × K −1 . The second algorithm is a generalization of the first one with using the jump operator, where generalized encryption map has an essentially higher degree in comparison with the previous version. Moreover, the degree of this generalized map is not bounded by some constant. This property guarantees resistance of the cipher to linearization attacks.
Introduction
This paper is an extension of article [1] reflecting our talk at the 5th International Conference on Cryptography and Security Systems (one of the events of Federated Conference on Computer Science and Information Systems, 2018). We expand our work by adding the generalization of our symmetric cipher of multivariate nature. Generalized encryption map has essentially higher degree in comparison with previous version. The degree is not bounded by some constant. This property insures resistance of the cipher to linearization attacks.
Graph theory is applicating in diverse fields such as linguistics, biochemistry, coding theory, cryptography, communication networks, etc. The history of the use of sparse algebraic graphs in symmetric cryptographical algorithms was described in [1] with the full list of references which begins with the ideas of V. Ustimenko presented in the article from 1998 (see [2] ). In this paper, we present only a short version of this history related to work of V. Ustimenko and his team. The reader can find also more general survey on some applications of Graph Theory in Cryptography in [3] .
The following known graphs defined over finite commutative ring K were used: ( , K) (see [2] ; for K = F graphs were defined in [4] ), ( , K) (Wenger graphs defined in [5] ), graphs ( , K) introduced in [6] , and graphs( , K) of [7] . Popular choices of K are finite fields F 127 , F 2 7 , F 2 8 , F 2 16 , and F 32 2 and rings modular arithmetic Z 2 7 , Z 2 8 , and Z 2 16 . This research history is presented in the next section. Section 2 observes graph based stream ciphers which use bijective encryption function of multivariate nature. In fact, multivariate cryptography uses nonbijective maps and a private key decryption is also given in each case of this type. However, the vast majority of stream ciphers is defined via bijective encryption. In each case of nonbijective symmetric encryption there is a deterministic decryption process that has to be described in clear way. In Section 3 we discuss the class of nonbijective multivariate maps defined in terms of Euler theorem for arithmetical rings Z , where is a composite number. Such a map has a special subset 2 Security and Communication Networks (domain) of affine space Z isomorphic to Z * × Z −1 , such that the restriction | of onto is injective (| | = | ( )|). It is important that | ( )| is unknown to the adversary, who knows only cipherspace Z . Correspondents use their knowledge on the password to obtain a description of ( ). They are able to compute bijective map dec from ( ) onto which is a decryption procedure; i.e., the composition of | with dec is identity map on . The definition of multivariate nonlinear map : Z → Z uses Eulerian map → + of Z with ∈ Z * and ( , ( )) = 1, where is Euler function.
An adversary does not have access to , , or . A hidden Eulerian equation of kind = gives a heuristic support to resistance of symmetric algorithm to attacks with interception of pairs plaintext/ciphertext. Notice that, in the case of classical RSA algorithm large decomposable into two primes is known, parameter is given. Security of RSA rests on the complexity of finding decomposition = or finding multiplicative inverse of . In practical cases of multivariate encryption with hidden Eulerian equation (like = 2 ) Eulerian function ( ) is easy to compute, but multiplicative inverse of is hard to find because the adversary simply does not know . In fact, in our examples the degree deg( ) = ( , ) of multivariate map on Z sending to codomain = ( ) heavily depends on parameter . Decryption map of into is induced by nonbijective multivariate map : Z → Z and degree ( , ) of degree deg( ) = ( , ). So "Eulerian parameters" and are very essential for cryptanalysis. This approach is illustrated by 3 "toy examples" of graph based symbolic computations (see ( ) at the end of Section 3 with items ( .1), ( .2), and ( .3)).
A linearization attack has to disclose codomain = ( ), determine the standard form of polynomial encryption map with its degree, and construct a polynomial map , such that | is identity function. If one of the parameters ( , ) or ( , ) is unbounded (or it is a large constant) then linearization tasks are infeasible. Of course, a cryptanalyst has to try alternative approaches like distinguish, Time Memory Data trade-off attacks, and guess-and-determine attack. These methods are constructed for investigation of stream ciphers with bijective encryption. Authors believe that in the case of multivariate nonbijective encryption such attacks have to be seriously modified for the practical implementation.
This approach is illustrated by three "toy examples" of graph based encryption. In Section 4 we introduce a class of bivariate graphs containing all the above-mentioned graphs. Such concept is convenient for uniform description of the encryption scheme and observation of common properties of graphs from this class (Sections 5 and 8). General Algorithm No. 1 is described in Section 5 presents symmetric cipher based on nonbijective maps. Implementation results are presented in Table 1 . The Algorithm No. 2, presented in Section 8, is a generalization of the first one with using the jump operator, where generalized encryption map has an essentially higher degree in comparison with the previous version. Moreover, the degree of this generalized map is not bounded by some constant. This property guarantees resistance of the cipher to linearization attacks. We compare graphs and related algorithms corresponding to different families ( ( , K), ( , K), ( , K), and( , K)) in Sections 6 and 9.
Last section is the conclusion where we discuss the choice of our model. Here the reader can find remarks on multivariate cryptography and its connections with cryptographical applications of algebraic graph theory.
RSA is one of the most popular cryptosystems. It is based on a number factorization problem and on Euler's Theorem. Peter Shor discovered that the factorization problem can be effectively solved by using a theoretical quantum computer. This means RSA could not be a security tool in the future postquantum era. One of the research directions leading to a postquantum secure public key is the multivariate cryptography, which uses a polynomial maps of affine space K defined over a finite commutative ring K into itself as encryption tools (see [8] ). This is a young promising research area because of the current lack of known cryptosystems with the proven resistance against attacks with the use of Turing machines. Another important direction of Postquantum Cryptography is the study of Hyperelliptic Curves Cryptosystems. We have to say that classical elliptic curves encryption will be not secure in the postquantum era.
Applications of algebraic graphs to cryptography started with symmetric algorithms based on explicit constructions of extremal graph theory and their directed analogues. The main idea is to convert an algebraic graph in a finite automaton and to use the pseudorandom walks on the graph as encryption tools. This approach can also be used for the key exchange protocols. Nowadays the idea of "symbolic walks" on algebraic graphs, when the walk on the graph depends on parameters given as special multivariate polynomials in variables depending from plainspace vector, appears in several public key cryptosystems.
Multivariate cryptography started from the study of potential for the special quadratic encryption multivariate bijective map of K , where K is an extension of finite field F of characteristic 2. One of the first such cryptosystems was proposed by Imai and Matsumoto and cryptanalysis for that system was invented by J. Patarin. A survey on various modifications of this algorithm and corresponding cryptanalysis can be found in [8] or [9] .
One of the first uses of nonbijective map of multivariate cryptography was in the oil and vinegar cryptosystem proposed in [10] and analyzed in [11] . Nowadays, this general idea is strongly supported by publication [12] devoted to security analysis of direct attacks on modified unbalanced oil and vinegar systems. It looks like such systems and rainbow signature schemes may lead to promising Public Key Schemes of Multivariate Encryption defined over finite fields. Nonbijective multivariate sparse encryption maps of degree 3 and ≥ 3 based on walks on algebraic graphs ( , K) defined over general commutative ring and their homomorphic images were proposed in [13] . Security of the corresponding cryptosystem rests on the idea of hidden discrete logarithm problem. U. Romańczuk-Polubiec and V. Ustimenko combine the idea of "oil and vinegar signature cryptosystem" with the idea of linguistic graph based map with partially invertible decomposition to introduce a new cryptosystem [13] . This algorithm can be implemented with the use of families ( , K) and ( , K) and natural homomorphism between them. Finally, in [14] "hidden RSA multivariate encryption" based on graphs ( , K) were proposed.
In this paper we modify the encryption map (private key) of the above-mentioned cryptosystem in terms of family of bivariate graphs defined over the commutative ring K. These maps have multivariate nature despite the "numerical implementation" in symmetric ciphers mode with the plainspace isomorphic to K * × K −1 .
Implementation of Algorithms Based on Bijective Maps
We worked on a software package that enables us to investigate strongly symmetric cases of stream ciphers based on graphs ( , K), ( , K),( , K), and ( , K), where K is the arithmetic ring. Some cases are already implemented by our team at the level of prototype model. Few algorithms have been implemented in the past for very special cases under supervision of V. Ustimenko. The history of implementation of these algorithms was described in [1] with the full list of references. Below we present only a short version of this history.
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The first implementation of ( , K) encryption was done in 2000 at the University of South Pacific (USP, Fiji Islands). The research team was composed by Professor V. Ustimenko, PhD Dharmendra Sharma (currently professor of University of Canberra), and postgraduate students V. Gounder and R. Prasad. The work was supported by the University Research Committee of the University of South Pacific (USP) grant. During this work the implementation of asymmetric mode was investigated with the chosen case for K was F 127 , with 127 being the closest prime to the size of ASCII code alphabet. It means that one has to delete just the delete service symbol and can encrypt arbitrary text files. The chosen string was ( ) = + , where are elements of the ring K = F 127 chosen in pseudorandom fashion. So that was a case of shifting encryption.
The affine transformations 1 and 2 were simply identities. The implemented cipher on ordinary PC was rather robust in performance, but with average mixing properties. It has been used at USP digital network working for campuses and USP centers located in 11 island countries of South Pacific region. The package was also used by ORACLE based system of the bursary office. Recently group of students from Okanagan College (affiliated with the University of British Columbia) implemented that stream cipher on a cluster network of PC for a large data encryption.
Another case with K = Z 256 and graph ( , K) was implemented under the Research Committee of Sultan Qaboos University (SQU, Oman) grant. The research team was composed of Professors Vasyl Ustimenko and Abderezak Tousane and students Rahma Al Habsi and Huda Al Naamani. The software uses one to one correspondence between elements of Z 256 and symbols of binary alphabet. It allows encryption of various file types (with extension doc, jpg, htm, avi, pdf, . . .) in a way that encrypted file is presented in the same format as the plaintext. The symmetric algorithm was used in academic networks of SQU and Kiev Mohyla Academy.
The systematic study of shifting encryption for cases of shifting encryptions of ( , K) was conducted at UMCS (Lublin, Poland). J. Kotorowicz used arithmetical rings Z (see [15] ). The encryption was essentially faster than in all previously known cases. The selected affine transformation leads to an encryption with very good mixing properties: the change of a single character of the plaintext or the change of a single character of the encryption string 1 , 2 , . . . , causes the change of at least 98% of the ciphertext characters. In the case of = −1 it can be proved that the order of ( , K) and ( , K) based encryption map grows with the growth of parameter . The comparison of orders was completed through the study of cycle structures of ( , K) and ( , K) encryptions. The obtained results showed similarity in both cases.
M. Klisowski implemented ( , K) and ( , K) shifting encryption on symbolic level in the cases of finite fields F 2 7 , F 2 8 , F 2 16 F 2 32 . In [16] A. Wróblewska proved that shifting ( , K) encryption is given by a cubical multivariate map (see also [17] The PhD thesis of M. Klisowski [18] contains the first results on ( , K) and ( , K) based multivariate maps which are not defined via shifting encryptions. He used symbolic strings of kind 1 ( ) = + 1 , 2 ( ) = + 2 , . . . , −1 ( ) = + −1 , ( ) = 3 + with constants , = 1, 2, . . . , for special fields F in which 3 = has unique solution. It was shown that such a choice makes direct linearization attacks impossible.
The first implementation for the case of Wenger graph based encryption was completed at the University of Sao Paolo (USP, Brasil) (see [19] and further references). Professors V. Futorny and V. Ustimenko chose field F 253 of which size is the closest from below prime to the size of binary alphabet. This research was partially supported by FAPESP foundation (grant for international cooperation with USP). Computer simulation demonstrated high speed of encryption. In [19] authors evaluated the diameter of graph ( , F ) and proved that the family of these graphs ( , ), ≤ is a family of small world graphs. Professor Routo Terada (USP, Brasil) suggested to investigate the behaviour of these algorithms under linearization attacks. Computer simulation supports the conjecture on a good resistance of the encryption scheme to such attacks.
The idea of using graphs ( , K) in cryptography was proposed by U. Romańczuk-Polubiec and V. Ustimenko in [6] .
Some stream ciphers defined via graphs( , K) were proposed by M. Polak and V. Ustymenko in [7] . Furthermore, M. Polak compared LDPC codes corresponding to ( , K), ( , K), and( , K) in [20] .
On the Idea of Nonbijective Maps Based on Eulerian Equations and Some Toy Examples
Let us consider the case of commutative ring Z , where is composite number. Classical scheme of multivariate bijection map on affine space Z is of the form 1 2 , where 1 and 2 are bijective maps of kind
where = ( , ), = 1, 2, . . . , is nonsingular matrix with entries from Z and is a nonlinear bijective polynomial map of kind
→ , ∈ Z . He discovered that if x is a regular ( ( , ) = 1) and is mutually prime with the order ( ) of multiplicative group of Z , then the preimage of = ( ) is unique. Eulerian theorem states that the solution of ( ) = is = , where is multiplicative inverse of in the group Z * , i.e., ≡ 1(mod ). Map defined on the set of positive 
( , ( )) = 1 and ∈ Z . It is easy to see that Eulerian map from one variable → = ( ), ∈ Z is far from being a bijection in the case of composite number. For example if = 8 and = 3, we have (0) = 0, (1) = 1, (2) = 0, (3) = 3, (4) = 0, (5) = 5, (6) = 0, and (7) = 7. However, we can use as encryption function on the plainspace Ω. Notice that 1 and preserve the subset Ω of the affine space Z . The restriction of composition 1 onto Ω is a bijection. So 1 sends plaintext
The image of (x) coincides with 2 (v) = y. For decryption, the correspondent applies 2 −1 to the ciphertext to obtain v and then the plaintext as 1 −1 ( −1 (v)). Notice that, for the computation of −1 (v), the correspondent has to use Euler theorem. As you see the plainspace of this scheme is smaller than cipherspace like in the well-known El Gamal method. The encryption map sends the Domain Ω onto (Ω) of the same size, but the location of these codomains is hidden from adversaries, because the map 2 is hidden from him/her. The encryption scheme described above can be generalized in various ways. For instance, one can define Eulerian map as → + . Some modifications are suggested in [21] where even more general definition of Eulerian map is given and nonlinear multivariate bijection is used instead of affine map 1 .
Another idea is based on deformations of bijective nonlinear multivariate map of kind 1 → ℎ( 1 ), → ℎ ( 1 , 2 , . . . , ), = 2, 3, . . . , . We assume that correspondents are able to solve (x) = c for x and refer to such multivariate transformation as the map with onedimensional invariant subspace.
We consider a map̃of kind 1 → 1 + , 2 → ℎ ( 1 , 2 , . . . , ), = 2, 3, . . . , , where ( , ( )) = 1 and ∈ Z * .
Obviously,̃sends Δ = {( 1 , 2 , . . . , ) | 1 ∈ Z * , ∈ Z , = 2, . . . , } tõ(Δ) of the same size. We consider the encryption map of kind = 1̃2 , where 2 ∈ (Z ) and 1 is an affine map of kind
So correspondents can use the plainspace Ω = {x ∈ Z |
The map̃transforms v into u = ( 1 , 2 , . . . , ) with 1 = V 1 + . Finally affine map 2 sends u to the ciphertext y. Decryption process: correspondent computes u as 2 −1 (y). He/she solves equation
Under the assumption that correspondents can compute the preimages of they can get v = (V 1 , V 2 , . . . , V ) and the plaintext x = 1 −1 (v).
Formally, our encryption map can be expressed as 1 2 , where is the map 1 → 1 ( −1 ( )) + , → , = 2, 3, . . . , . Clearly, representation of −1 in polynomial map can be a hard task.
In order to be able to use the above encryption, Alice has to compute the standard form = 1̃2 of kind → ( 1 , 2 , . . . , ), = 1, 2, . . . , . She has to prove that is computable in polynomial time. To hide parameter Alice can select
with deg(ℎ ) > . Notice that in RSA algorithm the ring Z and parameter of the map → , ∈ Z * are known. So one can use term hidden RSA for the presented scheme of multivariate public key algorithm. It means that correspondents may use decomposed not only into two large prime numbers, but also into other composite modules.
Let us assume that correspondents are going to use for private key symmetric encryption. Then they do not need to compute and share the polynomial form of . So in this case requirement < deg( ) is immaterial. Alice and Bob keep parameters , , and together with matrices 1 and 2 as part of their private key. They have to present for everybody the algorithm of computation for the value of in a given point
, ).
Of course the polynomial form of is important to study the adversary attacks in the case of interception of many pairs of kind plaintext/ciphertxt (linearization, distinguish, TMD, and guess-and-determine attacks). Known methods of cryptanalysis dealing with bijective encryption have to be modified for attacks on nonbijective multivariate maps.
Notice that (i)̃defined on Z has one-dimensional invariant subspace of tuples of kind ( , 0, . . . , 0).
So the map of kind = 1 2 , where nonlinear : Z → Z satisfies (i) and (ii) can be used as encryption tool for the plainspace Ω. The cryptosystem of this kind with defined in terms of algebraic graphs is proposed in [14] .
In this paper we used described above scheme with different core function to define family of graph based nonbijective stream ciphers. Finally we propose the following generalization of nonbijective encryption bases on the map with the properties (i) and (ii). Instead of (ii) we consider the following property:
(iii) The restriction of onto Δ = {x = ( 1 , 2 , . . . , ) | 1 ∈ Z * , ∈ Z , = 2, . . . , } is a bijective map.
In fact, the totality = (Δ, Z ) of all maps satisfying (i) and (iii) is a semigroup and the restrictions of elements from onto Δ form a group. For example, the above defined map̃is an element of in the case of = 0.
It is easy to see that a map of kind = 1 2 . . .
, ≥ 1 with nonlinear
: Z → Z where ∈ (Z ), = 1, 2, . . . , −1 and satisfies properties (i) and (ii). It means that 1 2 can be used for nonbijective multivariate encryption.
Let us consider a toy example of generation of bijective maps with one-dimensional invariant subspace and transformations with properties (i) and (ii) and elements from via symbolic walks on algebraic graphs.
Let us consider a commutative ring K and bipartite graph (3, K) with the partition sets = {( 1 , 2 , 3 ) | ∈ K, = 1, 2, 3} and
It is easy to see that for each vertex v there is exactly one neighbour u = (V) = (V) (v u) of chosen colour . So let us consider the walk in the graph with starting point p = ( 1 , 2 , 3 ) of length (number of edges). The information on the walk can be given by sequence of elements 0 = 1 , 1 , 2 , . . ., which are colours of vertices of the walk. The walk consists of vertices v 0 = p,
. . , − 2, then the walk does not contain consecutive edges. The walks with starting line [ 1 , 2 , 3 ] can be described in similar way. Notice that the description of walks is written uniformly for any commutative ring K.
To introduce "symbolic walks" in the graph (3, K) we need the infinite graph 
. The final vertex of the walk is a triple of kind 2 , 3 ) > where pair <, > stands for brackets (, ) in the case of even and parentheses [, ] in the case of odd .
We join corresponding coordinates of initial and last vertex of the above symbolic walk by arrows 1 → ( 1 ), 2 → ℎ 1 ( 1 , 2 , 3 ) , and 3 → ℎ 2 ( 1 , 2 , 3 ) and obtain the standard form of the transformation of 3 into itself. We use symbol = 1 , 2 ,..., for the map corresponding to the sequence of colours 1 ( 1 ), 2 ( 1 ), . . . , ( 1 ). Notice that for the computation of this map we use only operations +, −, and × of commutative ring K .
Obviously, affine subspace = {( , 0, 0) | ∈ K} is an invariant subset for the action of .
We can check the following:
(A) In the case of bijective map 1 → 1 ( 1 ) the transformation 1 , 2 ,..., is also bijective map. In fact the preimage of c = ( 1 , 2 , 3 ) can be computed fast as the final vertex of the following walk in the graph (3, K). Let = 1 be a solution of satisfies the property (iii).
is a bijective cubical map.
You can play with "Sage" and check that property (D) holds for instance in the cases = 3, 4 and 5.
(E) If K = Z where is prime integer then the map
as "encryption map" on K 3 with the password ( 1 , 2 , 3 ). Then different passwords produce distinct ciphertext. These properties follow from the fact that the girth (length of minimal cycle) of the graph (3, Z ) is eight. 
and denote this map as
. We consider encryption map
(G.2) Let us consider Eulerian map ( ) :
∈ Z and consider encryption 3 =
Assume that ring elements , , and integers , , are internal parameters of encryption algorithms 1 , 2 , 3 working with the same plainspace and the same keyspace of Security and Communication Networks 7 tuples ( 1 , 2 , 3 ). Symbolic computation with "Sage" allows to compare degrees of maps 1 , 2 , 3 . Computer simulations demonstrates the similarity of mixing properties of , = 1, 2, 3, with mixing properties of .
On the Class of Bivariate Graphs
Let K be a commutative ring. We define ( , K) as a bipartite graph with the set of vertices ( ) = ∪ , ∩ = 0. We call = K a set of points and = K a set of lines (two copies of a Cartesian power of K are used). We will use two types of brackets to distinguish points ( ) ∈ and lines [ ] ∈ : Let us consider the case of finite commutative ring K, with |K| = . As it instantly follows from the definition, the order of our bipartite graph is | ( )| = 2 and the number of edges is | ( )| = ⋅ = +1 . Graphs = ( , K) are -regular. In fact, the neighbour of a given point ( ) is given by the above equations, where parameters 1 , 2 , . . . , are fixed elements of the ring and symbols 1 , 2 , . . . , are variables. It is easy to see that if we set 1 then the choice uniformly establishes values 2 , 3 . . . , . So each point has precisely neighbours. In a similar way we observe that the neighbourhood of any line also contains neighbours. Notice that the order and degree of our graph defined via strings , , Let us consider some examples.
Wenger Graphs ( , K).
In 1991 Wenger defined the family of bipartite, -regular graphs ( ), where is prime number [5] . In [4] Lazebnik and Ustimenko introduced straight forward generalization ( , ) of these graphs via change of F to F , where is a prime power. They used special Lie algebra and proved that the family of bipartite, -regular graphs ( , ), ≥ 2. 
for 2 ≤ ≤ . The graphs ( , F ) have cycles of length 8. One can change finite field K for general commutative ring K and work with graph ( , K).
Graphs ( , K)
. Graphs ( , K) are formally appearing as tools for the study of ( , K) properties by V. Ustimenko. Later on the graphs ( , K) were presented with another name as an independent family ( , ) for the first time in [6] for cryptographic applications.
Let us use the following notations for points and lines in the graph ( , K): 
Graphs ( , K).
The following interpretation of a family of graphs ( , K) in case K = F can be found in [4] . By we denote the incidence relation for this graph. Let us use the following notations for points and lines: 
Graphs( , K).
Formal definitions for the family of graphs( , K) were presented in [7] . Construction of projective limits graphs of( , K) appears in papers motivated by results on embeddings of Chevalley group geometries in the corresponding Lie algebras and construction of blow-up for an incidence system of Weyl groups. Moreover, this structure is the base for construction of family of graphs ( , K) (see [7] ).
Let us use the analogical notations for points and lines in graph(K): 
for 3 ≤ ≤ . Graphs from families ( , K) and( , K) are bipartite, -regular, where |K| = . The girth of graphs from the described families increases with the growth of . In fact ( , ) is a family of graphs of large girth and there is a conjecture that ( , ) is another family of graphs of a large girth.
All graphs from the considered families are -regular and bipartite and the set of vertices is = ∪ , ∩ = 0. They are sparse graphs.
It is clear that there is a natural homomorphism of ( + 1, K) onto ( , K) of "deleting the last coordinate" that sends ( 1 , 2 , . . . , , +1 ) to ( 1 , 2 , . . . , ) and  [ 1 , 2 , . . . , , +1 ] to [ 1 , 2 , . . . , ] . It means that there is a well-defined projective limit (K) of graphs ( , K), → ∞. Bivariate graphs form a special subclass of so called linguistic graphs for which natural projective limits are defined in a similar way.
Recall that the girth = (Γ) of the graph Γ is the length of its minimal cycle.
Let us assume that the girth ( ) of graphs ( , K) is unbounded. The obvious inequality ( + 1) ≥ ( ) holds. It means that projective limit (K) has to be a |K|-regular forest. We have such situation in cases of graphs ( , F ) and ( , F ). If ≥ 2 then (F ) is a single tree presented by the above equations. Graph (F ) is an infinite forest containing infinitely many trees.
Projective limit (F ) of Wenger graphs is an infinite connected graph containing cycles of length 8.
General Encryption Algorithm No. 1
We can convert graph ( , K) to finite automaton in the following way.
(v) be the operator of taking neighbour of vertex V where the first coordinate is :
where ∈ K. The remaining coordinates can be determined uniquely using relations describing the chosen graph ( , K). We convert ( , K) to finite automaton via joining v an (v) by directed arrow with weight . We assume that all vertices of the graph are accepting states.
A bit more interesting object is a symbolic bivariate automaton. Let a( ) = ( 1 ( ), 2 ( ), . . . , ( )) be a string of elements from K[ ] (totality of polynomials in variable with coefficients from K).
We introduce operator a(x) (v), where v is a point or a line with coordinates V 1 , V 2 , . . . , V , of taking the last vertex of the path v,
We refer to a(x) as a computation of the symbolic automaton with the string
∈ K[ ], = 1, . . . , , and initial
It is easy to see that the restriction of this map on is a polynomial transformation of = K into (parameter is even) or (parameter is odd) of kind 1 , 2 , . . . , ) , . . .
Notice that generally is not a bijection. Let us consider an invertibility condition for .
Proposition 1. Let the equations of kind ( ) = , ∈ K have exactly one solution. Then map is invertible.
Proof. It is easy to check that if ( ) = then −1 ( ) = . It is easy to see that 1 ( 1 , 2 , . . . , ) = ( 1 ). Let p be some point from and (p) = ( 1 , 2 , . . . , ) (point or line). Then the equation ( 1 ) = 1 has a unique solution . So we can
We can compute the chain c = ( 1 , 2 , . . . , ),
In this case invertibility of each ( ), = 1, 2, . . . , , guarantees the bijectivity of a( ) . We refer to such case as recurrently defined string.
Let 1 and 2 be sparse affine bijective transformation of the affine space (free module in other terminology) K
where = [ , ] and = [ , ] are × matrices with , , , ∈ K. It is clear that
Let be a polynomial map of K to itself. We refer to = 1 2 as affine deformation of .
Symmetric Cipher No. 1.
We can use the data on the graph ( , K), the symbolic computation given by the string a = a( ) of polynomials 1 ( ), 2 ( ), . . ., ( ), where ( ) is a bijective map of K to itself and affine transformations 1 and
and keep the key in secret. Messages are written using characters from the alphabet K. So the plainspace is K and its elements must be treated as points (or lines) of the graph. To encrypt they use the composition
Notice that the computation has to be executed in numerical level:
(1) Correspondent Alice writes plaintext p = ( 1 , 2 , . . . , ) and computes
and treats V as point of the bivariate graph ( , K).
(2) She computes parameters = (V 1 ) for = 1, 2, . . . , . Remark 2. In the case of identity maps 1 and 2 one can try Dijkstra's algorithm for finding the shortest path between plaintext and ciphertext. Notice that its complexity is (V log V), but here V is exponential . Therefore we get worse complexity even than brute force search via the key space.
In the case of recurrently defined symbolic computation as above the encryption bijective map is =
As we already see, this encryption transformation is equivalent to 1 a( ) 2 , where a( ) = ( 1 ( ), 2 ( 1 ( )) , . . . , ( −1 (. . . ( 1 ( )))) ). Recurrently defined symbolic computation is an example of the polynomial map with an invertible decomposition. It has various applications in the development of multivariate key exchange protocols and asymmetric multivariate algorithm. The most popular case of implementation is related to graphs ( , K) and ( , K) (see [15, 17, 18] ), where K is a finite field of arithmetical rings Z and strings of kind 1 = + 1 , Let us consider the case of strong symmetric encryption, when the function is ( ) = + , with regular (invertible) element of K. In this case it is easy to show that degrees of encryption map and decryption map −1 are the same. The advantage of this case is its universality. One can implement it in case of arbitrary chosen finite ring K.
On Properties of Bivariate Graph Based Bijective Encryption Maps
The girth of simple graph is the length of its shortest cycle. It is a known fact that the girth of the graph ( , F ) is ≥ + 5. So in the case of shifting encryption the map with the password + 1 , + 2 , . . ., + , < +5 the encryption map has no fixed points. So ciphertext is always different from the plaintext. Let us consider deformed shifting encryption of kind . We assume that affine maps and are fixed. Correspondents are able to change string 1 , 2 , . . . , for another one.
We assume that + +1 ̸ = 0 for = 1, 2, . . . , − 2. Such choice means that encryption map corresponds to the path of length . The inequality ( ( , )) ≥ + 5 implies that different strings of length < ( + 5)/2 produce different ciphertexts. So even in the case when and are known to adversary the complexity of attacks without an access to unencrypted information is bounded from below by ( +5)/2 . Let M be a multiplicative subset of general commutative ring K, i.e., M is closed under the ring multiplication and it does not contain 0. We say that a string 1 , 2 , . . . , is |M|-regular if + +1 ∈ M for = 1, 2, . . . , −2. It was proven that different -regular strings of length < ( + 5)/2 produce distinct ciphertexts from the same plaintext. So in the case of |K| = , |M| = the resistance to attacks without access to unencrypted data is bounded from below by ( +5)/2−1 . It was proven that graphs ( , F ) form a family of graphs of increasing girth ℎ( ) that tends to infinity as grows. The speed of growth of ℎ( ) needs further evaluation. It was proven also that different |M|-regular strings of length < produce different encryption maps.
Results on |M|-regular strings of length restricted maps are obtained in terms of dynamical systems corresponding to graphs ( , K) and ( , K).
Let us assume that maps and are identities and consider the groups of transformations ( , K) and ( , K) generated by shifting encryption maps corresponding to strings of even length. In [16] it was proven that all elements of ( , K) are cubical transformations of affine spaces and . Similar result for ( , K) is stated in [6] . As it follows instantly from this result transformation = and its inverse are cubical transformations.
The cryptanalytic corollary of this statement is justification of linearization attacks on stream ciphers corresponding to stream ciphers based on graphs ( , K) and ( , K).
Let correspondents use the transformation . The adversary has knowledge on the general scheme of open algorithm but not on the data for and or on the shifting string. So he knows about cubic nature of encryption. We assume that he has access to the unencrypted information and is able to intercept quite many pairs of kind (p, c), where p is plaintext and c corresponding ciphertext.
Then adversary writes , which is a formal cubical map in standard form with the unknown coefficients in front of monomial terms. He or she is able to solve system of ( 3 ) equations of kind (c) = p and restore the map . So adversary could control the communication channel. The complexity of such direct linearization attack is ( 10 ).
On the Implementation of Graph Based Stream Cipher Based on Nonbijective Maps
Let us describe an implemented algorithm, which can run in the case of arbitrary commutative ring K and arbitrary bivariate graph ( , K). We slightly modify the above described symmetric algorithm based on bivariate graphs ( , K) which is not a case of shifting encryption. Firstly, we take a symbolic computation for string a = a( ) = ( 1 ( ), 2 ( ), . . . , ( )), with ( ) = + , = 1, 2, . . . , where is mutually prime with the order of K * . So equation + = , ∈ K * has at most one solution. We take 1 as an affine bijective transformation of kind
, where are linear functions from [ 1 , 2 , . . . , ]. Correspondents will use the plainspace
They will use 1 a( ) 2 as encryption map. To execute computation in time ( ) they take finite parameter and use loaded tables for ( ), = 1, 2, . . . , (one-dimensional arrays ( ), ∈ K * ). So they will compute 1 (p) = v = (V 1 , V 2 , . . . , V ), form sequence = (V 1 ), = 1, 2, . . . , and compute recurrently v = (v −1 ), = 1, 2, . . . , . They form the ciphertext c as 2 (v ).
To decrypt they will take c 0 = ( We selected string of polynomials as = + , ∈ K, = 1, 2, . . . , and special linear transformations 1 and 2 , given by the lists of linear forms.
We can theoretically evaluate degrees of encryption enc and decryption dec . In cases of graphs ( , K) and ( , K), these parameters are bounded below by some constants depending from parameters , = 1, 2, . . . , . We can select string of parameters and get dec large enough to make cryptanalysis a difficult task. In case( , K) the degrees are even larger; they have size ( ). Notice that direct linearization attacks are formally impossible because the encryption map is not a bijective one.
The implementation of the algorithms in the present work was done using the Python programming language, in particular version 2.7. The code does not use any out-of-thebox libraries for facilitating operations with matrices. The tests for measuring the processing time have been executed on a machine with Intel Core2 Duo CPU 9600 1.60GHz x 2, RAM memory 4.8 GB, operating with Ubuntu 16.04 LTS. The complexity of the algorithms is of order ( ), where is the length of the password. In particular, we implemented this stream cipher for the case K = Z 256 and ( ) = 3 + ( = 3 and dec = 43), = 1, 2, . . . , without using loaded tables for functions. Table 1 represents encoding and decoding time for three types of graphs and for different files size and length of passwords. A description of the implementation of "nonlinear part" of encryption process; i.e., computation of a is given in [1] . We recommend a password for which 2 and − +2 , = 1, 2, . . . , − 2 are regular elements of the ring. 
General Encryption Algorithm

, ]).
We create the jump fusion Ξ : K → K of nonlinear colour jump operator Ξ with modification previously defined in the following way:
(1) First step, we use Ξ to point x:
(we make a jump)
and we treat x as the point of the graph
In the next steps of jump fusion, we modified differently in the cases of even and odd parameter (2.1) If = 2 + 1, we use symbolic key defined by 
where
Final vertex of the path is
The jump fusion Ξ is the map
If the jump is trivial, i.e.,
In the case of affine deformation of Ξ by affine bijective transformation 1 and 2 of K our map
. . .
where 
, ).
Let us modify Symmetric Cipher No. 1 in the following way. The correspondents Alice and Bob use the data on the graph ( , K), with the colour jump operator Ξ , the symbolic computation given by the string a = a(x) of polynomials 1 ( ), 2 ( ), . . ., ( ), where ( ) is a bijective map of K to itself and affine transformations 1 and 2 in the following encryption scheme.
Thus, correspondents Alice and Bob agree on the private encryption key
where polynomials 1 ( ), 2 ( ), . . ., ( ) are defined differently depending on the length of the password , i.e.,
, and , ∈ K[ ] Notice that the computation has to be executed in numerical level also in this scheme:
(1) Correspondent Alice writes plaintext p = ( 1 , 2 , . . . , ) ∈ Ω and computes
(2) In the next step she uses the colour jump operator and computes
and treats V as point of the bivariate graph ( , K). Alice and Bob can use knowledge about their private key ( 1 , 2 , Ξ , a g ) for the decryption.
Let us assume that Bob receives the ciphertext c from Alice. To decrypt the ciphertext Bob proceeds as follows:
(1) He has to compute c 0 as 2 −1 (c). 
(6) Finally, he computes the plaintext p as 1 −1 (c ).
On the Implementation of Graph Based Stream Cipher Based on Nonbijective Maps with the Use of Nonlinear Colour Jump Operator
In this section we describe an implementation of general Encryption Algorithm No. 2 with the use of nonlinear colour jump function Ξ in the case of rings K = Z and K = F and graph ( , K).
We take a bijective transformation The encryption and decryption map have multivariate nature. Let us assume that deg( ) (odd ) and deg( ) (even ) are given by linear function of kind + , > 0. Then in the case of graphs ( , K) and ( , K) the degrees of encryption and decryption maps are bounded below by + + 2 and bounded above by 3( + ) because the shifting encryption is a cubical map.
Summary
The paper presents a class of stream ciphers defined in terms of graphs given by equations over the finite commutative ring K. The algorithm has multivariate nature: plaintext is a tuple from the free module K , key string is also an element of K , and the encryption map is polynomial transformation of K into itself. Users have options to vary parameters and and ring K. If the parameter is bounded by a constant, then the speed of numerical recurrent of encryption is ( ). The key can be given as a sequence of polynomials in a single variable . We observe results on simplest case of key strings + 1 , + 2 , . . ., + obtained by theoretical studies and via computer simulation in case of finite fields or arithmetical rings of kind Z 2 . In case of graphs ( , K) and ( , K) simple conditions on ensure that different keys produce distinct ciphertexts and allow estimating the complexity of adversary attacks without access to plaintext. In the abovementioned case encryption and decryption maps are cubical and adversary after the interception of ( 3 ) pairs of kind plaintext-ciphertext can conduct a linearization attack in time ( 10 ). In case of( , K) the degree of both maps grows linearly with the growth of parameter , which makes the search for the inverse map via linearization attacks a difficult task. Additionally, authors started investigation of bijective and nonbijective encryption maps with keys of kind + 1 , + 2 , . . ., + , where > 1.
In the nonbijective case the plainspace is large subset of K and the adversary has to restore the multivariate encryption transformation and search for polynomial map such that fixes each plaintext. Known methods do not allow to solve this task in polynomial time. Special case with high degree is implemented. Loaded tables for allow a fast encryption of text even in case of large parameter .
Our general Algorithm No. 2 uses encryption and decryption procedures of polynomial nature. Both procedures are approximated by maps of unbounded degree. This fact leads to resistance of the cipher to linearization attacks by an adversary.
Conclusion
The main purpose of this paper is to introduce stream ciphers with nonbijective encryption function of multivariate nature constructed in terms of algebraic graph theory. This class of encryption transformation has already been used as a tool of multivariate cryptography for the construction of public key candidates to be used in postquantum era. The idea of "hidden Eulerian equation" melted in large variety of coefficients of multivariate public rules was used as heuristic argument of security. We apply this idea in Symmetrical Cryptography which is not endangered by appearance of Quantum Cryptography and introduces robust stream ciphers resistant to linearization attacks. Authors agree that for practical uses further research is needed. Statistical evaluation of mixing properties via measuring of avalanche effect has to be done. We have to compare such properties in the case of Algorithm No. 1 and Algorithm No. 2 and bijective multivariate graph based encryption. Besides linearization attacks other tools have to be used like distinguish, Time Memory Data trade-off attacks, guess-and-determine attack, and various attacks of algebraic nature. Authors believe that the abovementioned attacks which were developed to investigate bijective encryption have to be seriously modified to work with nonbijective ciphers. We hope that our algorithms will attract attention of cryptanalysts and they will test cryptanalytical instruments on such new families of ciphers. We have to compare such properties in the case of Algorithms No. 1 and No. 2 and bijective multivariate graph based encryption. Besides linearization attacks, other tools have to be used like Distinguishing attack, Time/memory/data trade-off attack, Guess-and-Determine attack, Resynchronization attack, and various attacks of algebraic nature (see [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] ).
Data Availability
Some parts of data (Table 1 ; General Algorithm No. 1) used to support the findings of this study are included within the article. This paper is an extension of our article no. 1 which reflects our talk at the 5th International Conference on Cryptography and Security Systems, 2018 (one of the events of Federated Conference on Computer Science and Information Systems, FedCSIS 2018).
